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Abstract 
Nigeria, the West African local hegemon, has been actively involved 
in the integration process and stability of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) sub-regional arrangement since 1975 
when the organization was established. Though motivated by national 
interests in line with her foreign policy objectives, Nigeria’s role in 
ECOWAS was even more profound particularly in her genuine, 
benevolent, hegemonic peacekeeping and peace-enforcement 
operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, since the beginning 
of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the country’s position, especially on 
commitment towards peacekeeping and enforcement operations as a 
strategy for the resolution of West African armed conflict, has been 
passive. It is against this background that this article interrogates 
continuity and changes in Nigeria-ECOWAS relations since the 
democratic dispensation of the Fourth Republic. The study upholds 
the fact that a fundamental issue, which has influenced Nigeria’s 
unwillingness and unenthusiastic stance in the use of force and huge 
financial contributions in ECOWAS intervention in West Africa  
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armed conflicts, is because majority of Nigerians back home consider 
such adventure as wasteful for a country that lacks critical 
infrastructure and basic amenities. Closely related to this is the fact 
that democratic and civilian regimes are more vulnerable to pressure 
from public opinion, parliament, and the press. This brings to bear the 
nexus between foreign policy, public opinion, and domestic politics. 
The study concludes that Nigeria government must improve domestic 
situation in order to enjoy popular support for her ECOWAS objective 
of regional stability. 
 
Keywords: ECOWAS; hegemon; foreign policy; peace-enforcement; 
conflict resolution. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since 1999, Nigeria has been actively involved in the promotion 
of West African sub-regional cooperation through the Economic 
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). The unending 
hostile international system as well as the struggle over scarce 
and finite resources compelled countries to interact in line with 
their national interests through multilateralism. This readily 
explains Nigeria’s participation in West African sub-regional 
integration. The success of a sub-regional organization such as 
ECOWAS also requires the tremendous support from the local 
sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, to actualize its objectives. This 
paper therefore examines the dynamic nature and changing 
pattern of interactions between Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 
the Fourth Republic. The essay also explored some historical 
antecedents, which have influenced the intensity, changing 
pattern as well as Nigeria’s commitment towards the ECOWAS.    
 
2. Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS 
Nigeria was very actively involved in the formation of the 
ECOWAS on 28 May 1975. This was motivated by certain 
imperatives that govern the conceptualisation and conduct of the 
country’s foreign policy towards her regional neighbours. These 
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imperatives include; defence and protection of Nigeria’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty from both internal and 
external aggression. In addition, peaceful co-existence and 
maintenance of good neighbourliness and friendship with 
countries it shares contiguous boundaries (be it land, air or 
waters); and concerns about stability as well as economic 
integration in the West African sub-region (Bassey and Nyonge 
2012:271-290). These obviously interlocking and coterminous 
elements, coupled with the ever-growing population of the 
country, defined the behaviour and realistic analysis of Nigeria’s 
role in the regional integration process in the sub-region.  
Equally important was Nigeria’s quest for a sub-regional 
security and stability. The Nigerian Civil War opened the 
country’s leaders to the precariousness and vulnerability of the 
country to its immediate Francophone countries, which are 
greatly influenced by France. In the course of the war, Cote d’ 
Ivoire, a  Francophone country, recognised the state of Biafra, 
while Benin Republic and Chad under the influence of France 
gave secret support to the secessionist Biafra state. Apart from 
Cote d’Ivoire, the French government assisted the Biafra forces 
through her former Francophone colonies. Thus, after the war, 
the Gowon administration, aware of the security threat Nigeria’s 
immediate neighbours posed to the country’s existence in 
addition to France’s influence over the countries, initiated a 
platform that would unite Nigeria and countries in the sub-
region, and thereby reduced France influence over its former 
colonies. Negotiations thereafter culminated in the formation of 
the ECOWAS in1975 (Asiwaju 1984:33-34). 
As previously mentioned, several reasons necessitated 
Nigeria’s commitment to the ECOWAS and its member states. 
These range from its experience during the civil war (1967-
1970) when France used Cote d’Ivoire in an attempt to break 
Nigeria via provision of support to the Biafra secessionists, 
economic factor and the desire to increase and enhance its unity 
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and bargaining profile with the rest of the world. Former 
Nigerian military leader, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, also adduced 
the factor of complex and interlocking security boundaries with 
West African countries, which makes Nigeria vulnerable to 
crisis that jeopardize the stability and prosperity of the country 
(Obuoforibo 2011:73-74). 
It was these same reasons that prompted Nigeria to mobilize 
ECOWAS member states to invoke the 1981 Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance in Defense (originally designed to deal with external 
threats and aggression in the light of Cold War realities) to 
intervene in the Liberian Civil War and other subsequent 
interventions in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire just to mention 
but a few. 
With its huge population and resources, Nigeria’s domestic 
market makes it a regional economic super power. It has also 
made the selling of oil at concessionary prices to poor 
ECOWAS member states to cushion the hardship precipitated 
by the global energy crisis of the early 1970s; thus, enhancing 
the country’s position and influence in its efforts towards 
achieving sub-regional integration (Nwoke 2005:135-137). 
Nigeria has also made this same overture to Cote d’Ivoire a few 
years ago in its desperate fight against the phenomenon of 
illegal oil bunkering in which the latter was alleged to have 
stolen from Nigeria. 
 
3. Nigeria’s commitment to ECOWAS objective 
Different political administrations and leadership in Nigeria 
have committed to the ECOWAS objectives with varying 
degrees. One of such leader was General Olusegun Obasanjo, 
whose tenure as a military of Head of State spanned between 
1976 and1979. In the words of Abutudu, General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, then Nigerian military head of state, “with 
pronounced nationalist fervor”, threw aside the long-term goals 
and spirit of sacrifice that the Gowon administration had shown 
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in the integration project and began to press for immediate 
benefits for Nigeria (Nwachukwu 1991:33-36). 
First, General Obasanjo raised objections to a situation 
whereby Nigeria was contributing over 35 percent of the 
organization’s annual budget. The proportion of Nigeria’s 
contribution was thereafter reduced to 25 percent. Moreover, the 
Obasanjo government emphasized the need for commensurate 
benefits with the burden borne by Nigeria through its enormous 
commitment to ECOWAS. Concerning where the sub-regional 
body’s headquarters would be located, the then Head of State 
demanded that it should be located in Nigeria, despite earlier 
agreement between General Gowon and Eyadema for the 
organization to be located in Togo. For Obasanjo, whatever 
policy Nigeria is pursuing in ECOWAS and the sub-region must 
be benefit-driven for the country and its peoples (Jinadu 
2005:17-19). Furthermore, Obasanjo formulated new and more 
stringent criteria for providing foreign aid to West African 
countries. The new criteria were as follows: 
 
a.  Promotion of national interest (45%) 
b. Taking into account high and middle level manpower in 
Nigeria (20%); 
c. Contributing to national economy and creating productive 
capacity for Nigeria (25%); and  
d. Providing relief during disasters and national emergencies in 
the recipient country (10%) (Bolarinwa 2005:211-216). 
 
In sum, the spirit of sacrifice and selflessness, which 
characterized Gowon’s orientation for the ECOWAS project 
was completely absent in Obasanjo’s military regime. The 
indifferent posture from the Obasanjo’s military regime 
continued into the President Shehu Shagari civilian 
administration as well as the General Muhammad Buhari 
military government. President Shagari embarked on a mass 
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expulsion of a large number of West Africans, described as 
“illegal aliens”, in response to the fundamental structural crisis 
in which Nigeria was enmeshed by 1983. The anti-regionalism 
stance was given a military flavour when, in April 1984, Buhari 
closed all of Nigeria’s land borders. The borders remained 
closed for about two years and the measure was justified in 
terms of the exercise of changing the national currency, which 
was an ongoing and anti-smuggling policy, and response to 
other criminal practices that were sabotaging the Nigerian 
economy (Dauda 2013). 
Nigeria also banned food exports to ECOWAS member 
states. The impact of this was seriously felt among Nigeria’s 
neighbours to the West such as Benin, Togo, and Ghana. 
Nigeria’s trade relations with these countries were virtually 
brought to a halt. This situation was further aggravated in May 
1985 when the Buhari administration embarked on a mass 
expulsion of about one million “illegal aliens” mostly of 
Ghanaian origin. Interestingly, this was done just about two 
months to the crucial ECOWAS Summit where arrangements 
for the second stage of the ECOWAS Free Movement policy 
were to be finalized. The actions of Shagari and Buhari were 
later re-visited by the Babangida regime on 25th August 1986 
and thereafter relapsed.  
However, despite the ambivalence of some Nigerian leaders 
towards ECOWAS some years back, what is not in question is 
that ECOWAS provides the Nigerian government the platform 
to promote the country’s socio-cultural, economic, and political 
interests. Nigeria’s leadership role in the sub-region had enabled 
ECOWAS to respond effectively to intra-state conflict in West 
Africa. The formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), through the initiative of Nigeria’s Head State, 
General Ibrahim Babangida, in 1990 was instrumental to 
addressing intra-state conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
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same pattern continued under Abacha and Abdulsalami 
administrations, respectively.    
 
4. Continuity and change in Nigeria-ECOWAS relations  
    since 1999 
It is truism in International Politics that foreign policy is an 
extension of domestic politics (Osuntokun 2015:353). This 
assertion is true because the impact of domestic politics in the 
years shortly after 1999 has tremendously influenced the ways 
and manner Nigeria conducts her external affairs with 
ECOWAS. The reality is that democratic and civilian regimes 
are more vulnerable to pressure from public opinion, parliament, 
and the press.    
Hence, unlike the military juntas of Bangagida, Abacha, and 
Abudsalami when Nigeria bore the burden of ECOWAS 
particularly with military interventions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, the country’s approach toward similar development from 
1999 has been markedly different under President Olusegun 
Obasabjo, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, and Goodluck Ebele 
Jonathan administrations (Aworawo 2011:386-404). Indeed, 
Nigeria was actively involved in attempt to find lasting solution 
to the crisis and disagreements that engulfed Cote d’ Ivoire  
shortly after Gbagbo refused to hand over power to Alassane 
Ouattara after the latter’s electoral victory in November 2011.  
The three successive administrations of Obasanjo, Yar’Adua 
and Jonathan explored the multilateral channel of ECOWAS to 
help in the resolution of the crisis. Accordingly, Obasanjo 
worked with his Ghanaian counterpart, President John Kuffor, in 
reaching a peace agreement that was later abandoned by parties 
to the conflict. Thus, Nigeria’s involvement in the resolution of 
the Ivorian conflict through ECOWAS was limited to diplomatic 
approach during Obasanjo era. As a result, when the Sub-
regional organization decided to send a one-thousand-five-
hundred-strong force to join the French peacekeepers in Cote 
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d’Ivoire, Nigeria declined to participate in the operation in 
January 2003. Consequently, ECOWAS troops came only from 
Benin, Gambia, Niger, Ghana and Togo.  
In a related development, Nigeria equally declined to feed her 
forces in ECOWAS-led military operation in Guinea-Bissau. 
Instead, the country chose a diplomatic approach. The absence 
of the regional local hegemon, Nigeria, from ECOMOG forces, 
which involved the smaller countries was responsible for the 
premature termination of the operation just after four months 
(Osuntokun 2008:141-150). 
The approach was very different from the position the Nigerian 
government took when the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
broke out in the late 1980s and during the 1990s (Sanda 2012:411-
413). In those instances, Nigeria took the lead and sent by far the 
largest contingent in addition to bearing more than three-quarters of 
the cost of the operations (Adebajo 2008:178-180). The stance 
maintained by Obasanjo towards the Ivorian crisis was continued 
under the Umaru Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan administrations 
from 2007 to 2015. For one thing, Yar'Adua and Jonathan 
experienced different problems before securing the presidency 
and they were first preoccupied with establishing their legitimacy and 
promoting national stability. Yar'Adua had become president after a 
very controversial election, which many believed was rigged and 
Jonathan assumed Nigeria's leadership first as Acting President 
after the sickness and death of Yar'Adua and the controversies it 
created (Aworawo 2011:23-27).  
In addition to all these, Nigeria has been confronted with 
varieties of problems of its own, particularly the Boko Haram 
insurgency which these leaders struggled to solve, with very 
modest success. Under these circumstances, the logical option 
by the Nigerian leaders was to follow the approach of minimal 
involvement in the Ivorian crisis that Obasanjo had adopted. 
Some analysts of Nigeria's foreign relations have expressed the 
view that Nigeria's position on, and involvement in the 
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resolution of the Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire was less than 
impressive, especially under the Obasanjo presidency during 
which period much of the fighting in the country took place. 
One aspect that has been emphasized is the fact that, apart 
from Nigeria's nonmilitary involvement, the country did not 
play its usual leadership role even in the diplomatic aspect as 
well. For instance, it was France that helped to negotiate the 
Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LCLMA) in January 2003, while 
Ghana took the initiative in the negotiations leading to the 
signing of the Accra III Agreement in July 2003. As the Ivorian 
crisis lingered, South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki took the 
lead in organizing an AU-sponsored peace talks among Ivorian 
leaders leading to the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in April 
2005. Even much less-powerful African states such as Burkina 
Faso seized the initiative at some point and Burkinabe President, 
Blaise Compaoré did organize negotiations leading to the 
conclusion of the Ouagadougou Agreement in March 2007, just 
as the Togolese leader Gnassingbe Eyadema had done in 2001. 
None of the negotiations were arranged by Nigerian leaders, 
except under the auspices of the ECOWAS or the AU. This has 
led to the conclusion by some that Nigeria's policy towards West 
Africa changed from the period of the Obasanjo government, 
considering the fact that in 1999, just a few months after taking 
office, President Obsanjo also declined to send troops to support 
peace-keeping in Guinea-Bissau. And it was also during this 
period that many Nigerian soldiers were withdrawn from Sierra 
Leone.  
Attempts have been made to explain Nigeria’s attitude 
towards involvement in the Ivorian crisis. According to 
Aworawo (2011:22-26), the difficulties encountered by 
Nigeria’s involvement in the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
and negative attitude to such extensive involvement by a large 
section of the Nigeria society were the dominant influences. In 
fact, such intervention was unpopular with the Nigerian public. 
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That coupled with the failure to achieve swift success in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone had major deficiencies within the military. 
Against the backdrop of experiences from Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, Obasanjo refused to commit Nigeria’s soldiers. In other 
words, Nigeria had become peace-keeping-wearied and the 
policy adopted by the government was in line with popular 
feelings and public opinion in Nigeria.    
Some others have contended that the Nigerian government 
carefully considered all the issues and the complexities of the 
Ivorian crisis and concluded that military intervention would not 
be the right option. The Nigerian authorities reckoned that apart 
from the huge financial and human costs, which the country 
could not afford at the time, military intervention would have 
been interpreted by parties to the conflict to mean support for 
one group against the other. In addition, considering the large 
number of Nigerians in Cote d'Ivoire, intervention would spell 
disaster, as Nigerians in the country would surely be targeted for 
attack by one or more of the rebel groups. 
The fact that France was already deeply involved in the 
resolution of the crisis in both military and diplomatic forms, the 
attitude of Cote d’Ivorie towards Nigeria during the Nigerian 
Civil War, and the fact that Cote d’Ivoire does not occupy a 
particularly important strategic calculations, would have been 
other reasons. Be that as it may, what is beyond dispute is that 
Nigeria's position on the Ivorian crisis was a reflection of the 
changing pattern of Nigeria's policy towards West Africa since 
the early 2000s. Nigeria’s response to a similar crisis in Guinea-
Bissau in 1999 confirms this.   
As already noted, the Yar’adua and Jonathan administrations 
maintained a similar policy up to 2015. It is nevertheless 
gratifying to note that bilateral relations between Nigeria and 
Cote d'Ivoire remained cordial all through the period of the 
Ivorian Civil War. While some may accuse Nigeria of not doing 
enough, hardly can anyone accuse the Nigerian government of 
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doing anything to worsen the already complex crisis. It is also 
important to stress that Nigeria took some positions on the 
Ivorian crisis that reflected commitment to high ideals by 
insistence on a government that would be democratically elected 
by Ivorians and on a government that would be committed to the 
rule of law.  
Thus, the Nigerian government condemned Guei's military 
coup in 1999 and the attempt to truncate the democratic process 
in 2000. A similar position was maintained in 2010 when 
Laurent Gbagbo, who had benefited from a popular democratic 
uprising in 2000, which brought him to power, refused to hand 
over power to Alassane Ouattara that had been declared winner 
by the electoral commission. 
Indeed, President Jonathan along with other ECOWAS 
leaders threatened to use military force to remove Gbagbo to 
bring to an end the Ivorian crisis in March 2011 (The Nation, 
2011:60). Nigeria's consistency in sticking to ideals rather than 
supporting individuals in the Ivorian crisis has endeared her to 
many in political and diplomatic circles not only in Cote d'Ivoire 
but across Africa. This should promote even closer ties. 
Intra-regional trade is yet another area of interactions 
between Nigeria and ECOWAS since the beginning of the 
Fourth Republic. Nigeria has the largest trade volume within the 
sub-region. Nigeria’s major trading commodity to the 
international market is crude oil. Yet all the ECOWAS member 
states cannot consume up to 10% of total oil production from 
Nigeria. This has accounted for very little trade between Nigeria 
and ECOWAS since 1999. For instance, in 2000, only about 6% 
of Nigeria's exports (mainly oil) was traded with ECOWAS 
members. Most of the oil went to Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. On 
the other hand, less than 2% imported goods (mainly from 
Benin, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire) came from ECOWAS to 
Nigeria. This has accounted for very little trade between Nigeria 
and ECOWAS since 1999. Though there is a lot of informal 
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trade in smuggled goods from Benin to Nigeria. In terms of 
formal trade, imported goods such as  cars, manufactured goods, 
machinery, chemicals, beverages, tobacco and cereals to Benin 
are thereafter re-exports to Nigeria (Oche and Charles 2003:366-
371).  
However, Nigeria's export to the ECOWAS region, which 
averaged about 7 percent of its total exports between 2001 and 
2006, plummeted to 2.3 percent in 2010. The share of other 
ECOWAS countries in Nigeria's imports also dropped from 4.4 
percent in 2009 to less than 0.5 percent in 2010 (Nwokoma 
2010:225-227). In addition, only 2% of total Nigeria exports and 
3% of total imports are within the region. This, however, makes 
it difficult for Nigeria to use ECOWAS market as a catalyst for 
economic development.   
A major factor hindering the Nigerian government from 
exploiting the ECOWAS economic potentials has to do with 
non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers constitute the most 
significant hindrances to integration and trade in West Africa. 
They include government instruments, such as, import 
prohibition and quota restrictions. Non-trade barriers are divided 
into official (operationalized by the government) and unofficial 
barriers. Government motivated by non-tariff barriers have been 
maintained by more than half of ECOWAS states as an 
instrument for trade control. Import prohibitions and quota 
restrictions have featured regularly in the trade policy processes 
of West African countries, a contradiction to the principles on 
which ECOWAS was established. For instance, Nigeria still 
maintains import prohibitions on some products, including those 
originating from ECOWAS member states (Ogaba 2010:186). 
In terms of sectorial coverage, Nigeria import prohibitions 
have included agricultural products such as fruits, vegetables, 
grains, meat and fish in addition to rubber, wood, textiles and 
various chemicals. Unofficial non-tariff barriers, which directly 
impede trade facilitation, include bureaucracy, corruption in 
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customs processes, slow port operations, poor roads and 
communication infrastructures, just to mention but a few. The 
ills associated with the unofficial non-tariffs barriers had over 
the years constituted a major predicament hindering some 
business organisations and individuals as well as some 
government agency involved in promoting economic 
development in Nigeria from the sub-region.  
In the area of telecommunication, Nigeria had, since the 
dawn of the new millennium, benefited from investment cutting 
across the sub-region. Nigeria’s private-owned telecomm 
company namely Globalcom not only provides telecomm 
services to Nigeria but also, in some West African countries 
such as Benin Republic and Ghana (Aribisala 2015:2). The 
economic advantages of ECOWAS for Nigeria’s economic 
development are enormous. However, the absence of basic 
infrastructure that would galvanize domestic economic 
development in the sub-region had made it difficult, if not 
impossible for Nigeria to achieve this goal. Indeed, Nigeria 
possesses all that is required to be an economic powerhouse in 
the sub-region. However, the country’s leaders are yet to show 
commitment to the actualization using the ECOWAS as an 
extension of Nigeria’s economic development.  
The inherent weakness of the Nigerian domestic economic 
environment, which focuses primarily on crude oil as the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, has in many ways hindered 
the country from asserting herself economically in the sub-
region. Furthermore, the absence of stable power has been one 
of the major banes indicating why Nigeria is struggling 
economically to assert herself in the sub-region. By the time all 
these issues are addressed, the Nigerian state, her citizenry, and 
business organisations will benefit maximally from the sub-
region, by exploring ECOWAS as a springboard for economic 
development. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has dispassionately examined the changing patterns 
of Nigeria’s sub-regional cooperation through ECOWAS since 
1999. It explored how the country’s internal politics has shaped 
its interaction with ECOWAS. It concluded that Nigeria’s 
approach since the beginning of the Fourth Republic has been 
more of diplomacy conducted through ECOWAS as opposed to 
the era of military intervention. In essence, and in many 
respects, the leadership style and public opinion have shaped 
continuity and change in Nigeria-ECOWAS relations since 
1999. 
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